Biography:

Eduardo is a student of International Politics and Government at Bocconi University in Milan, with a focus on political theory, diplomacy and European affairs.

He received his primary education at the Fulham Bilingual, working through both the French and English curricula. He then studied at the Lycée Français Charles de Gaulle de Londres, where he completed the OIB Brevet and the Baccalauréat Français International (BFI), receiving Mention Très Bien in both. He is now in his second year of his bachelor’s degree at Bocconi University.

He grew up across several European cultural contexts and works fluently in multiple languages, including French, English, German and Italian. His areas of interest include diplomacy, philosophy, history, religion and theology, photography, translation and research, and European politics.

He is currently working on a translation of the Ambrosian Missal in English alongside multiple essays on history and politics. He serves as the President of Aleph Analisi Strategiche, Italy’s premier, and Bocconi’s only, Geopolitics, Security, and Political Economics student Think Tank.

Influences and Philosophy

Method and Orientation

My approach to political and philosophical questions begins from the assumption that human action is intelligible only when situated within a broader account of meaning, responsibility, and historical continuity. Politics is not treated here as a self-contained technical domain, but as an activity embedded in moral anthropology, institutional inheritance, and limits that precede individual choice and calculation.

Methodologically, my work is situated at the intersection of normative reasoning and historical analysis. I am sceptical of purely procedural or technocratic accounts of political life, not because they lack practical utility, but because they abstract from the moral premises they necessarily presuppose. At the same time, I resist forms of moralism that detach judgment from institutional reality, and take seriously the constraints imposed by power, contingency, and historical circumstance. Political action unfolds within structures that shape, limit, and sometimes frustrate intention, and any serious account of politics must begin from this fact.

Political judgment, as I understand it, is neither purely deductive nor merely empirical. It requires prudence, attention to context, and an acceptance of tension between competing demands that cannot always be reconciled. Universality and particularity, law and necessity, ideals and compromise are not oppositions to be resolved in advance, but conditions under which responsible action becomes possible. For this reason, I am more concerned with the conditions of judgment and responsibility than with the construction of closed or exhaustive systems.

Finally, tradition is approached not as an object of nostalgia, nor as an authority immune from criticism, but as a living source of orientation. It is something to be interpreted, questioned, and at times resisted, yet never ignored without cost. Continuity and rupture, faith and reason, authority and freedom are treated here not as problems demanding immediate resolution, but as enduring questions that structure inquiry itself and delimit the horizon of political and philosophical thought.

Intellectual Lineages

My intellectual formation is shaped by several traditions that do not resolve neatly into a single system, but which together provide a framework for understanding political action, moral responsibility, and historical continuity. These traditions are approached not as objects of allegiance, but as sources of method, tension, and orientation.

Philosophically, my thought is grounded in the classical and scholastic tradition, particularly in its account of human action as ordered toward intelligible ends. From Aristotle and later from Saint Thomas Aquinas, I inherit an understanding of politics as inseparable from moral anthropology, and of prudence as the central virtue of political judgment. Political action, in this view, is neither reducible to technique nor dissolvable into intention, but unfolds within concrete circumstances that demand deliberation about means, ends, and consequences. This framework provides both a resistance to moral relativism and a caution against abstract moralism, grounding normativity in the realities of human limitation and social life.

At the same time, this classical inheritance is tempered by a sustained engagement with Saint Augustine, whose political thought introduces a tragic sensibility absent from more harmonised accounts of political order. Saint Augustine’s insistence on the effects of disorder, pride, and misdirected love serves as a corrective to any overly optimistic conception of politics as a domain of moral fulfilment. From him I draw a heightened awareness of the limits of political projects, the fragility of institutions, and the permanent risk of confusing order with justice. Politics is here understood as necessary and meaningful, yet incapable of bearing ultimate moral weight.

Modern moral philosophy introduces a further tension. From Kant, I take seriously the demand for moral universality and the irreducibility of duty, particularly in questions of responsibility toward others. While I remain sceptical of attempts to transpose Kantian moral reasoning directly into political design, his concern for the dignity of persons and the limits of instrumental reasoning informs my resistance to purely consequentialist or technocratic accounts of political action. This concern remains operative even where prudence requires compromise or restraint.

In political theory and historical analysis, my orientation is shaped by a realist sensitivity to power, institutions, and contingency. I approach the state not as a moral abstraction, but as a historical form that emerges to secure order, continuity, and survival. Sovereignty, legitimacy, and authority are therefore treated as political realities before they are moral ideals. This does not amount to an endorsement of cynicism or force as such, but to a refusal to ignore the conditions under which political orders endure or collapse. Historical experience, rather than moral aspiration alone, is taken as a primary guide in assessing political possibility.

Alongside this realist orientation, I maintain an interest in the role of law, tradition, and institutional continuity as sources of legitimacy. Political orders are sustained not merely by coercion or consent, but by shared understandings that develop over time and acquire normative force through practice. This concern informs my attention to constitutional forms, legal traditions, and the slow accumulation of authority that resists both revolutionary rupture and technocratic erosion.

Finally, religious and theological sources inform my understanding of the limits of politics and the dangers of its absolutisation. Theology does not function here as a political programme, but as a horizon that places political action within a broader account of human purpose and moral responsibility. It serves, above all, to remind political thought of what it cannot finally secure, and to discipline the temptation to treat political order as a substitute for moral or spiritual fulfilment.

Taken together, these intellectual lineages do not produce a closed doctrine. They instead form a field of tensions within which political judgment must be exercised. Rather than resolving these tensions prematurely, my work proceeds from the assumption that they are constitutive of serious political and philosophical inquiry.

Limits and Open Questions

This framework does not aim at the construction of a comprehensive doctrine, nor does it presume that the tensions outlined above can or should be resolved in advance. Political institutions and forms of authority are historically contingent, morally imperfect, and structurally limited in what they can secure, and the refusal to acknowledge this fragility often results either in moral rigidity or in the aestheticisation of power. A central concern of this inquiry is therefore the boundary between prudence and concession, and the difficulty of distinguishing necessary compromise from moral abdication under conditions of uncertainty and constraint. Unresolved questions are treated here not as failures of theory, but as the proper condition of responsible political judgment, within which restraint, responsibility, and seriousness acquire their meaning.